Robert R. Mullen

## ECA Informational Guidance, 1951

ECA's evolution into a principal implement for free world rearmament naturally calls for some fresh direction in our informational policies and operations. Before getting into specifics, I'd like to point out some of the new factors entering considerations in our Washington staff and line.

The first is that the old lines of demarcation between certain other government agencies and our own are becoming less clear. Until now we could say that in a general way it was State's job to explain and sell abstract political policy to overseas peoples, while our job was to sell a tangible economic program. That may still hold, but in a sense, but at least for a transitional period I suspect the demarcation will be quite blurred. After everything is rattled down, and other agencies are in position to operate effectively overseas, the line may be more charply drawn again. All we can do at this point is try to see thirty, sixty, ninety days ahead and lay out guide lines for the short pull, not the long haul. And during this short pull we have got to make many ad hoc adjustments with other agencies in Washington, and will, therefore, necessarily have to radiate more and more guidance to our ECA information people from here. This will apply across the board to labor and farm, as well as to general ECA information. We share with State and Defense the responsibility for publicizing MDAP activities in Europe and in Asia, and we share with Defense and State the responsibility for informing the American people about these activitics.

This situation will be carried further, at least for the next few months, by the fact that it is planned to lay before Congress a package entitled American Mid. This package will include an integration of final Marshall Plan, new MDAP, Point Four and other overseas aid items, and our rublic presentation of ECA's part must be related to the package.

All this obviously requires more touching of base with State and Defense. We have already set up committees; these are now being followed - by working parties. We must retain our own clear identity and our own freedom of action in this process, but closer working together is needed.

These other agencies appreciate that we are geared up to run, while in some cases they are not yet in that position. Therefore, for some months to come it is my feeling that we will carry a disproportionate share of the overseas load, and will do so, not necessarily because we are ECA per se, but because we happen to be the arm of the U. S. Government in position to act most quickly. We may, for that reason, take on jobs here in Washington for the field which at first glance may not appear to be strictly within ECA's orbit, but which are essential for the purposes of the U. S. as a whole. One example of that was in connection with Eisenhower's initial survey of European potentialities.

Foster talked with disenhower here, told him something of ECA's European resources, including information. One result was that we talked with disenhower's press people here and Drummond met them in Paris and we performed certain jobs for them simply because we were there, ready and able to do them. We are working with Spofferd. We can and should do much more of this in many parts of the world. Indeed, as will be developed in the discussion of policy that follows, these activities tie directly into our new informational objectives.

So, while some functions of ECA may be completed, or have to be thrown overboard for the time being, information is entering a period when acute demands for quick results will be made upon us.

As to policy. Always remember that we are facing aggression from within no less than from without. Therefore, while it may be fair to say that recovery phase of ECA has ended and that the defense phase has begun, much attention should be given the fact that our new slogan "Strength For The Free World" means more internal economic strength as well as more external military strength. This points to heavy emphasis for labor information. Moreover, although the Marshall Plan as a recovery plan has very largely accomplished its purpose, the Marshall Plan concept or idea of partnership, of mutual aid and self-help, continues.

Since EC. is now global in operations, it is natural that our policy lines should vary somewhat in different parts of the world.

In isia, for example, where we must make a major effort in the next few months, it is wise to make military assistance secondary to the top theme that cooperating with imerica is the surest way to enjoy freedom, stability and prosperity. For those new nations still sensitive to outside domination we can play up the Marshell Plan concept as one of partnership, and point out that it has dealt with the sovereign powers of Europe without question of ascendancy. We can drive home the point that the U. S. has no colonies, obviously wants none, witness the Philippines. Instead, the U. S. wants a free world of good suppliers and customers, and ask who is to suffer from that? Is evidence of our good faith, we are trying to help with health and agricultural and other programs to bring stability and prosperity to isia, and shouldn't a tree be judged by its fruits?

Of course, it is clear that certain elements in the world don't care much for stability, for good health, more food, and freedom. Against such weird and uncertain mentalities, certain protective measures have to

be taken. Therefore, the  ${\tt U.\ S.}$  is willing to share some of its weapons in defense.

The above general line should be used as a tent. In all literature, posters, movies, radio programs, speeches and what not, be absolutely sure that our imerican motives are made abundantly clear along the lines above. We may have been a little weak in presenting our motives before, but always remember that it is our motives, more than our acts, which the Communists attack. They will say, "Sure, the imericans are killing a few bugs, but why? What is their mysterious, nefarious purpose in creeping around Asia, which should be reserved solely for isiatice?"

Hit back with a good strong motive line in every item we produce. But don't stop there. Our specific task is still to publicize and support a program. Any project should be well advertised. The jeeps carrying the DIT crews should be painted with our shields, the spray guns should be blatantly covered with our emblems. Arm bands for the workers and all the rest of it should be routine. Our program is anything but a secret.

One thing more: In these materials, posters, movies and the like, carry through to the results. For instance, in a pamphlet describing DDT, end it up with pictures of people enjoying glowing, vigorous health as a result. Picture prosperity. Make up a picture book showing a farmer enjoying all his heart ever dreamed of, a water buffalo, a brick house, overflowing storage bins, an electric light, a radio, and kids in

the corner studying school books, while he relaxes. Give it a caption: "This Is What America Wants For You. Lct's Work Together To Attain It".

To summarize: 1. Nail down American motives.

2. Support the program.

3. Picture results.

In Western Europe our top objective for the time being must be to induce and accelerate rearmament. We can say that the object of the recovery effort was to provide a better life; now, because of certain negative and avaricious characters in the Kremlin who have enslaved many millions of unfortunate individuals, we must protect that recovery. We can still insist that the fruits of recovery must be retained, but it may be just as well, at this point, to quote a military source on that. For instance, Eisenhower:

"A nation cannot long have security without solvency, nor solvency without security".

is to inducing rearmament, at the present time we might usefully make our top theme the thought that <u>Europe is stronger than it thinks</u>. To play up the present danger, its imminence and proportions, and <u>Europe's unpreparedness</u>, is likely to discourage and chill.

To make comparisons of basic items of strength - steel, skills, etc. - may encourage. Let us, then, begin to picture Europe not as a bug ready to roll over and give up, but as a virile organism of immense potentialities, and simply urge haste in harnessing up the potentialities.

The goal of doing all this while boosting total output by \$100 billions a year, as Foster has proposed, is heartening, inspiring and obviously right. Let's hit this theme time and again.

It permits us to point out that further integration, which is to say creation of a large market and large production, contributes to the goal,

as does productivity and all the rest of the themes we twanged in the days of our singing of the recovery refrain.

It is vital that we carry through our propaganda by picturing the kind of world we want: free, each nation carning its own way, prosperous, too strong and united to be attacked. We also went, and this can be hammered, an improved lot for all the people, better homes, higher real wages, etc.

Therefore, all speeches, movies, radio, plugs, advertisements, posters, pamphlets, or what-have-you should include,

- 1. Strong statement of merican motives.
- 2. Positive support of a tangible program.
- 3. Enticing picture of results.

In the United States, where we are not engaged in propaganda, we must continue to give our people complete information on the progress of our Asiatic and European programs. Our legitimate objective is to correctly inform, interest and educate Americans in the economic affairs of the countries in which we operate.

To some extent we must answer Communist lies about failure by continuing to make plain that the Marshall Plan is a success, and competently managed. This is the fact. No amount of propaganda should be permitted to distort it.

It is also our plain task to accurately depict our allies to Americans. As they grow in strength we should completely report it. We should continue, and expand, our facilities for helping American journalists, radio, movie and other people to get the facts about our operations overseas. We should assist them in every way possible to get accurate views, and every freedom to arrive at their own conclusions.

For this job EC1/W will continue to need a flow of good reporting from the field.